A Tractable Model of Indirect Asset Liquidity by Herrenbrueck, Lucas & Geromichalos, Athanasios
A Tractable Model of Indirect Asset Liquidity∗
First version: September 2015
Published version: DOI 10.1016/j.jet.2016.12.009
Lucas Herrenbrueck† and Athanasios Geromichalos‡
JEL Classification: E41, E51, E52, G12
Abstract: Assets have “indirect liquidity” if they cannot be used as media of exchange,
but can be traded to obtain a medium of exchange (money) and thereby inherit monetary
properties. This essay describes a simple dynamic model of indirect asset liquidity, pro-
vides closed form solutions for real and nominal assets, and discusses properties of the
solutions. Some of these are standard: assets and money are imperfect substitutes, asset
demand curves slope down, and money is not always neutral. Other properties are more
surprising: prices are flexible but appear sticky, and an increase in the supply of indirectly
liquid assets can decrease welfare. Because of its simplicity, the model can be useful as a
building block inside a larger model, and for teaching concepts from monetary theory.
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————————————————————————–
Recently, interest has increased in tractable models of asset liquidity that are easy to
analyze and can provide benchmarks for understanding the relationship between
monetary policy and asset market frictions. For example, Williamson (2012), An-
dolfatto and Williamson (2015), and Rocheteau, Wright, and Xiao (2014) analyze
policy using models in which multiple assets can take the role of a medium of ex-
change, usually to different degrees, which makes them imperfect substitutes and
the question of their relative supplies interesting. Furthermore, a number of recent
papers have suggested that the notion of asset liquidity may be the key to ratio-
nalizing some long-standing asset pricing-related puzzles (see for example Lagos,
2010, Geromichalos, Herrenbrueck, and Salyer, 2016, and Jung and Lee, 2015).
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The assumption that assets such as US Treasuries or claims to capital serve
as media of exchange is popular in monetary theory (going back to Geromicha-
los, Licari, and Suarez-Lledo, 2007, and Lagos and Rocheteau, 2008), but is some-
times questioned based on realism. In Geromichalos and Herrenbrueck (2016a),
we demonstrated that indirect asset liquidity can support many of the same con-
clusions, while offering an alternative microfoundation of imperfect asset substi-
tutability: in this conception of liquidity, assets are substitutes to money because
agents can sell them in a secondary financial market, and thus obtain the money
needed to make a purchase. This detail is important because it implies that the
structure of financial markets has first-order consequences for the ‘moneyness’ of
different types of assets, and therefore their trading volumes and prices. It is also
empirically supported, as we discuss in Geromichalos et al. (2016).
The goal of this essay is to present a very simple model which preserves the
essential concept of ‘indirect liquidity’, but which is maximally tractable. This
allow us to illustrate important results which are latent in some earlier papers,
but perhaps not fully developed or understood. As a first example, we show that
the optimal supply of indirectly liquid assets is not-too-large and may be zero.
Second, the ease at which assets can be traded affects the price level. The reason is
that a fall in ease of trading reduces the effective supply of liquidity and thereby
increases, in textbook terms, the demand for money. Third, our model implies a
new formula for constructing a monetary aggregate that contrasts with popular
alternatives. Finally, we think the simple model will be useful as a building block
for general applications in academic and policy work.
1 The model
As in the framework of Lagos and Wright (2005), time is discrete and goes on
forever, and agents discount the future at rate β < 1. Each period is divided into
three stages. At the end of a period, a competitive “centralized” market opens in
which agents produce and consume a general consumption good over which they
have linear preferences, and allocate their wealth between two different assets. The
first asset, “money” M , is fully liquid in the sense that it can be used to purchase
special consumption goods. These goods are traded in a “decentralized” goods
market which opens in the middle of each period; this market is subject to search
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frictions, and agents are anonymous and lack commitment. Therefore, a medium
of exchange is required, and money is the only asset that can play this role. The
second asset is a real discount bond b which is illiquid in the sense that it cannot be
used to purchase consumption. Instead, these bonds can be liquidated in an over-
the-counter asset market (OTC henceforth), which opens at the beginning of each
period, for money; because agents anticipate this, they may value the bonds at a
liquidity premium in the centralized market even though the bonds are never used
as media of exchange. In this sense, bond liquidity is indirect.
There are two distinct types of agents: consumers and producers of special
goods. The latter are trivial in this model: as they can never consume special
goods, they have no need for liquid assets. There is a measure ` of them, their
cost of production is linear with slope normalized to 1 in terms of the general con-
sumption good, and they have zero bargaining power in the decentralized market.
Because the consumer-agents make all the interesting economic decisions, we sim-
ply refer to them as “agents” from here on. These agents value consumption of
q units of the special consumption good at u(q), a strictly increasing and concave
function. There is a measure 1 of them, and when trading with a producer, they
make a take-it-or-leave-it offer that exactly compensates for the cost of production,
so the total surplus u(q) − q in every trade for the special good is also the con-
sumer’s surplus. There is a quantity q∗ which satisfies u′(q∗) = 1; we call it the
“first-best” quantity because it maximizes the total surplus. Because a medium of
exchange is required, however, actual trade in the special good will often be for
less than this quantity.
There is a government whose only function is to maintain the supply of money
and bonds. Bonds are issued and redeemed in the centralized market, and new
money is introduced via lump-sum transfers to agents in the centralized market.1
The money supply grows at rate µ > β − 1, which determines inflation in steady
state; for convenience, we express this with the parameter i ≡ (1 + µ− β)/β.2
1 Because of linear preferences in this market, it does not matter for aggregate outcomes who
initially receives the new assets. In every equilibrium all agents will end the period with the rep-
resentative portfolio (or be indifferent to doing so). We also do not explore the motivation of the
government to choose particular levels of transfers or debt. In a broader context, whether monetary
policy is set in terms of a monetary or in terms a fiscal transfer can matter a great deal, especially
in a liquidity trap (Herrenbrueck, 2014; Andolfatto and Williamson, 2015).
2 This parameter can be interpreted as the cost of liquidity. It is sometimes called the nominal
interest rate; in a world where liquidity premia exist, it should be clarified that i would be the
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At the beginning of every period, a proportion ` < 1 of agents learn that they
will be matched with a producer, and thereby have the opportunity to consume
the special good in this period. However, because at the end of the last period they
did not know if the consumption opportunity would arise today, all agents hold
the same amounts of money and bonds; in particular, some hold money that they
do not need in the same period, and others hold bonds that they would like to sell
in order to get more money.
This portfolio reallocation happens in an OTC market characterized by fric-
tions.3,4 The first friction is that trade is bilateral and matching is random, and the
total number of matches is f < min{`, 1 − `} so that nobody matches with cer-
tainty. Second, to make things tractable, we assume that the asset seller makes a
take-it-or-leave-it offer and therefore extracts the full surplus from the OTC trade.
Compared to more general bargaining protocols, this simplification matters qual-
itatively only for the OTC market price of bonds, although it will quantitatively
affect other variables. It also eliminates an asset pricing indeterminacy present in
Geromichalos and Herrenbrueck (2016a).
An equilibrium will be characterized by three endogenous variables. The first is
the quantity of special goods bought by consumers who did not obtain additional
money in the OTC market, denoted by q0. The second is the quantity of special
goods bought by consumers who did obtain additional money in the OTC market,
denoted by q1 > q0. The third equilibrium object is the real price of bonds in the
centralized market, denoted by ψ.
To make things even simpler, we want to restrict attention to equilibria in which
asset buyers are never constrained by their money holdings in the OTC. A suffi-
cient condition which assures this is that inflation is not too large, in particular:
i < (`− f) [u′ (q∗/2)− 1]. We will maintain this assumption from now on.
We might also be interested in characterizing welfare, which is here given by
the surplus of consuming special goods, averaged between consumers of special
goods who had the opportunity to rebalance and those who did not:
nominal interest rate on an asset that is either perfectly illiquid or in such large supply so that its
liquidity properties do not matter at the margin.
3 Other models of portfolio reallocation include Alvarez, Atkeson, and Kehoe (2002), Berentsen,
Camera, and Waller (2007), Berentsen, Huber, and Marchesiani (2014), and Lagos and Zhang (2015).
4 OTC market structure is empirically relevant for a large class of assets, including some that
we think of as very liquid (Duffie, Gaˆrleanu, and Pedersen, 2005; Afonso and Lagos, 2015).
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W = (`− f) [u(q0)− q0] + f [u(q1)− q1]
1.1 Equilibrium with real bonds
We can now state three equations determining general equilibrium in the endoge-
nous variables {q0, q1, ψ}.
(Money demand) i = (`− f) [u′(q0)− 1] + f [u′(q1)− 1]
(OTC trade) q1 = min {q∗, q0 + b}
(Bond demand) ψ = β [1 + f (u′(q1)− 1)]
In this environment, the Friedman Rule i = 0 implements the first-best allocation
q0 = q1 = q
∗. In what follows, we analyze welfare outcomes conditional on a fixed
i > 0, and we are agnostic as to why a particular i was chosen by the policy maker.
The formula for the bond price ψ can be interpreted as the product of the “fun-
damental value” β and a liquidity premium. (In particular, it can easily imply a
negative real interest rate if i is large enough.) Comparative statics with respect
to bond supply or bond liquidity are now straightforward. First, observe that if
b ≥ q∗− (u′)−1[1 + i/(`− f)], then an OTC bond seller will not sell all of her bonds.
In this case, the bond supply is “abundant”, and it does not affect the equilibrium
quantities, prices, or welfare at the margin. But bond liquidity does matter, even if
the bond supply is abundant: an increase in f will make it easier for agents to ob-
tain cash ex post, and they will therefore demand less ex ante. This will drive down
real balances (which may matter on its own, as an increase in the price level), and
for a large enough increase in f , real balances will be so low that bonds are not
abundant after all.
This other case, where an OTC bond seller will sell all of her bonds and the
bond supply is therefore ”scarce”, is obtained when b < q∗− (u′)−1[1+ i/(`− f)]. It
is much more interesting: increases in the bond supply b reduce real balances pre-
trade (q0) but increase them post-trade (q1), and therefore also increase the bond
yield 1/ψ − 1; the aggregate bond demand curve is downward sloping.
In the scarce case, the effect of the bond supply on welfare is more complex and
depends on the shape of the utility function:
dW
db
= f(`− f) [u
′(q1)− 1] · u′′(q0)− [u′(q0)− 1] · u′′(q1)
(`− f)u′′(q0) + f u′′(q1)
5
In general, the sign of the derivative is ambiguous, but we can say more in two
special cases. First, if the bond supply approaches the abundant level, we have
q1 → q∗ (by definition of “abundant”) and therefore u′(q1) → 1. As long as the
reasonable assumption u′′(q∗) < 0 is satisfied, this implies that dW/db is always
negative when b approaches the abundant level.5 Second, because u is concave,
u′(q0) is always greater than u′(q1). If u′′(q1) is greater in absolute value than u′′(q0)
(both are of course negative, so u′′′(q) ≤ 0 would be a sufficient condition for that),
then welfare is always decreasing in the real supply of bonds – an outcome in con-
trast to most other models of bond liquidity.
We now turn our attention to a quadratic utility function for which we can
compute general equilibrium explicitly. Let u(q) ≡ (1 + σ)q − 1
2
q2, which has the
properties u′(q)− 1 = σ− q and q∗ = σ. First, if b ≥ i/(`− f), then the bond supply
is abundant and does not affect the equilibrium:
q0 = σ − i
`− f (1a)
q1 = σ (1b)
ψ = β (1c)
If, on the other hand, b < i/(` − f), then the bond supply is scarce and the
equilibrium is:
q0 = σ − i
`
− f
`
b (2a)
q1 = σ − i
`
+
`− f
`
b (2b)
ψ = β
[
1 +
f
`
(
i− (`− f) b
)]
(2c)
This formula for the bond price ψ has some very convenient properties. The
liquidity premium is linear in the cost of carrying money (i) and in the aggregate
supply of bonds (b). It is also strictly increasing (although not linear) in the prob-
ability of trade in the OTC (f ) for the entire range b ∈ [0, i/(` − f)) where the
5 This result is not sensitive to parameters or the OTC bargaining protocol; it is just an applica-
tion of the envelope theorem to the fact that q1 → q∗ for a large bond supply. Welfare at low bond
supplies is another matter. In a similar framework, Huber and Kim (2015) show that the optimal
bond supply is always intermediate – between zero and the abundant level – as long as bargaining
power in the OTC market is also intermediate.
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liquidity premium is positive, and this range is itself expanding in i and f .
Perhaps surprisingly, the bond price is independent of σ (which can be inter-
preted as the size of the liquidity shocks). The intuition is that the liquidity pre-
mium measures the ability of the asset to catalyze a need to obtain liquidity ex post,
which arises because agents hold too little liquidity ex ante. If σ increases, liquidity
becomes more valuable both ex post and ex ante, so that the value of rebalancing is
exactly unchanged in this special case.
As the quadratic utility function satisfies u′′′(q) = 0, it implies the counterin-
tuitive result that welfare is decreasing in the real supply of bonds throughout, as
long as they are scarce. Using u′′(q) = −1, we can compute directly:
dW
db
= −f(`− f)
`
b
How can a greater supply of liquid bonds be bad for welfare? The reason is simply
that as agents anticipate that it has become easier to obtain money ex post, they
hold less money ex ante to self-insure against the liquidity shocks. Consequently,
q1 increases (up to q∗) while q0 decreases. The key thing to notice is that if the bond
supply is large enough, then q1 ≈ q∗, so the surplus of an agent who did rebalance
in the OTC is almost flat. By the envelope theorem, this agent’s marginal increase
in utility is negligible. But as q0 < q1, the decrease in q0 that results from a larger
bond supply gets a large negative welfare weight.
Total consumption could in principle go in both directions, but in the special
case of quadratic utility, it is easy to compute that it equals `σ− i independently of
the bond supply. As a consequence, total welfare must be decreasing in the bond
supply because the negative effect on q0 always has a larger marginal utility weight
than the positive effect on q1.
Our analysis has a flavor of the famous result that welfare may be higher in
an economy where bonds are illiquid in some sense (Kocherlakota, 2003; also,
Geromichalos and Herrenbrueck, 2016a, and Berentsen et al., 2014).6 However,
our focus here is on changes in the supply of bonds for constant levels of liquidity,
and our take-away message is twofold. First, the aggregate supply of liquidity is
6 Certainly, we can compute the comparative statics of f as well. In the special case with
quadratic utility, average consumption is independent of f but welfare is U-shaped: maximized at
the corners f = 0 and f = ` and minimized in the interior. With real bonds, the welfare-minimizer
is f = 0.5`, and with nominal bonds (case below), it is decreasing in the bonds-to-money ratio.
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not a sufficient statistic for welfare; the distribution of liquidity matters. Second,
the optimal supply of bonds does not drive liquidity premia to zero.
1.2 Equilibrium with nominal bonds
Instead of a real bond in supply b, say that there is a nominal bond in supply B. In
this case, the real bond price is not very meaningful, so we want to use the nominal
bond price p instead. (Using the money demand equation, it is easy to show that
p ≤ 1, i.e. the nominal yield on this bond cannot be negative even though the real
one can.) The equations governing general equilibrium are as follows:
(Money demand) i = (`− f) [u′(q0)− 1] + f [u′(q1)− 1]
(OTC trade) q1 = min
{
q∗, q0
(
1 +
B
M
)}
(Bond demand) p =
1
1 + i
[1 + f (u′(q1)− 1)]
In an important contrast to the previous model, money is no longer neutral, at
least in the case where bonds are scarce. We will discuss this in detail below in
Section 2. But first, we continue our quest for closed-form solutions and use the
quadratic utility function from Section 1.1 again. If B/M ≥ i/[(` − f)σ − i], then
the bond supply is abundant and the equilibrium is:
q0 = σ − i
`− f (3a)
q1 = σ (3b)
p =
1
1 + i
(3c)
If, on the other hand, B/M < i/[(` − f)σ − i], then the bond supply is scarce
and the equilibrium is:
q0 =
M
`M + fB
(`σ − i) (4a)
q1 =
M +B
`M + fB
(`σ − i) (4b)
p =
1
1 + i
(
1 + f
i (M +B)− (`− f)σ B
`M + fB
)
(4c)
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The resulting equations are more complex than Equations (2); for example, the
bond price is no longer linear in the bond supply. However, the main comparative
statics are comparable. An increase in the bonds-money ratio B/M reduces the
bond price p, increases q1 but reduces q0 and, thereby, total welfare – up to the
point where B/M ≥ i/[(`− f)σ − i], after which further increases have no effect.
We also gain some new insights from this example. For one, in contrast to the
example with real bonds, the bond price is decreasing in σ, the size of the liquidity
shocks. Intuitively, an increase in the overall demand for liquidity now increases
the demand for money (which is weighted by `) by more than the demand for
bonds (which is weighted by f < `); this drives down the bond price, potentially
to a point where bonds are no longer scarce and their price is at the fundamental
level. The specific outcome depends on the shape of the utility function, but it
is a powerful example which shows that how exactly we model the “demand for
liquidity” matters in subtle ways.7
2 Discussion
In this essay, we have constructed a simple model of indirect asset liquidity that
admits convenient closed-form solutions for a variety of applications. In a model
with real bonds, the resulting equilibrium equations are exceptionally simple: for
example, the price of real bonds is linear in the bond supply and in the cost of
liquidity. In a model with nominal bonds, the equations become less clean, but
clearly illustrate the non-neutrality of money. To analyze this point in more detail,
consider the determination of the general price level, defined as the ratio of money
supply to real money demand, P ≡ M/q0. Assuming that the bonds are scarce in
OTC trade, we can transform Equation (4a) from the quadratic model to obtain:
P =
`M + fB
`σ − i (5)
As the equation reveals, the price level is increasing as a function of inflation,
7 There is also an interesting technical difference compared with the model of real bonds: the
equation describing how the post-trade quantity q1 is determined from the pre-trade quantity q0 is
now multiplicative instead of additive. This will only interest modelers, but it makes it possible to
get closed-form solutions with a CRRA utility function with general risk aversion. The resulting
equations can be found in the appendix below.
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decreasing as a function of the size or frequency of the liquidity shocks, and in-
creasing in the liquidity of asset markets. This result is important: in particular, it
stands to reason that a collapse of financial intermediation such as the one seen in
2008/09 would affect the economy as a simultaneous decrease in the broad supply
of liquidity services (`M +fB), and an increase in the demand for narrow ones (M
in this model). If monetary policy was unchanged, this should have caused a fall
in the price level; equivalently, since we saw a big increase in the monetary base,
the argument explains why this increase has not been inflationary.
Notably, of course, the example shows that money is not neutral when nominal
bonds are scarce: an increase inM will cause an increase in p and q0, and a decrease
in q1. Why? The reason is that the price level is proportional to the total stock of nom-
inal assets that have a liquidity role, not to the money supply alone. When only one
of these assets increases in quantity, then the price level will not increase in pro-
portion. Changing the money supply via typical open market operations, where
money is exchanged for another fairly liquid asset category such as government
bonds or bank reserves, will only amplify the non-neutrality (see also Rocheteau
et al., 2014). An increase in M financed by a decrease in B will increase the bond
price (i.e. reduce nominal interest rates on the bond); as a result, pass-through of
the monetary shock to the price level will be incomplete. Even though prices are
flexible in this model, they can look sticky.
In contrast to some of the models listed at the beginning of this essay, the sim-
ple model here is not capable of exhibiting a liquidity trap situation where bond
demand becomes flat at low interest rates. However, this is not true of the concept
of indirect liquidity in general: Herrenbrueck (2014) describes a continuous-time
model of indirect liquidity in which a liquidity trap can exist.
The idea that many assets contribute to providing monetary services is not new;
for example, Fried and Howitt (1983) suggested that future research should estab-
lish “the appropriate definition of money for questions of inflation and unemploy-
ment”. One popular approach is the Divisia method for constructing monetary
aggregates (Barnett, 1978, 1980). This method involves first determining what the
fundamental cost of liquidity is (i in our model), then weighting assets according
to their “user cost”. For example, if it happens that i = 6%, then an asset yielding
3% receives half the weight of cash (which yields 0%) in the monetary aggregate.
Our model identifies a problem with this method. In Equation (5), the weights on
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money and bonds can be interpreted as their average contributions to the supply
of liquidity, while the difference between their yields and the fundamental yield
i measures their marginal contributions. This matters both for the level and for
changes. For one example, the liquidity premium on an asset can be zero if the
asset is illiquid, but also if it is abundant (and it may be very liquid). Either way, it
will receive zero weight in the Divisia aggregate. For another example, an increase
in the bond supply B will increase the bond yield and thus reduce the weight
on bonds in the Divisia aggregate, leading it to underestimate the increase in the
overall liquidity supply.8
Despite its resemblance to the undergraduate textbook model of money de-
mand, this model has more subtle implications. For one, while the demand for
liquid assets certainly depends on the total demand for goods, it is not necessarily
true that different levels of income are “associated” with different interest rates,
even for a fixed combination of asset supplies. As the solutions above make clear,
bond yields may depend on the overall demand for liquidity, but not necessarily
– because a change in this demand may be distributed on all assets in proportion
to their existing uses, or it may not be. The second difference from the simple text-
book model is that changes in the interest rate (real or nominal) on a particular
liquid asset do not reveal much about the interest rate available to anyone not is-
suing this asset, or even about i, a point which has of course been recognized for a
long time. However, questions of this kind are exactly what our simple model of
asset liquidity can usefully address.9
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APPENDIX – NOT FOR PUBLICATION
As suggested earlier, we can also get closed form solutions for the model with
nominal bonds if we use a CRRA (power) utility function, which we could not do
in the model with real bonds. Let u(q) = q1−γσγ/(1 − γ), with γ > 0, which again
has the property that q∗ = σ. Bonds are abundant ifB/M ≥ [(i+`−f)/(`−f)]1/γ−1,
and in this case the equilibrium is:
q0 = σ
(
`− f
i+ `− f
)1/γ
(6a)
q1 = σ (6b)
p =
1
1 + i
(6c)
If, on the other hand, B/M < [(i+ `− f)/(`− f)]1/γ − 1, then the bond supply
is scarce and the equilibrium is:
q0 = σ
(
`− f + (1 +B/M)−γ f
i+ `
)1/γ
(7a)
q1 = σ
(
(`− f) (1 +B/M)γ + f
i+ `
)1/γ
(7b)
p =
1
1 + i
(
1− f + f i+ `
(`− f) (1 +B/M)γ + f
)
(7c)
As in Equation (4c), the bond price is not linear in any variable, but depending
on the question, it may have other attractive properties. Note that it is independent
of the size of the liquidity shock σ, as was the case in Equation (2c) but not (4c).
The deep reason is the same as before: if liquidity becomes more valuable then
the demand for liquid bonds goes up, but this is exactly offset by the endogenous
change in the price level that makes their effective supply go down. Any increase
in the value of liquidity falls proportionally on money and bonds.
Finally, we can use Equation (7a) to obtain a formula for the general price level:
P =
(i+ `)1/γ
σ
[
(`− f)M−γ + f(M +B)−γ]−1/γ (8)
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